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ABSTRACT 
We try to get a handle on whether capacity expansion timing patterns in 
oligopoly among incumbents are followed. We study the United 
Kingdom ´s petroleum refining industry between 1948 and 1998. Using 
fixed-effects logit models, we find that U.K.´s refiners have not followed 
any definite capacity expansion-timing pattern. 
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Introduction 
 
 In high fixed costs industries where product homogeneity predominates, demand shocks 
happen at aggregate level. Since capital equipment is usually specific to this kind of industries, 
the costs of CEs tend to be irreversibly sunk, thus (very) expensive commitments are generated 
when CEs are made.  
The petroleum refining is a high fixed cost industry especially characterised by 
irreversibility. This suggests trying to find out whether firms follow some type of CEs timing 
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behaviour to optimise investment decisions when they expand capacity. We define a CE timing 
pattern as some kind of CE execution among competitors, which repeats (more or less) regularly. 
In the Industrial Organisation literature, the most important published articles which have 
taken up timing issues at least tangentially when testing CEs as strategic tools among 
incumbents, have been Lieberman [1987a, b] and Gilbert and Lieberman [1987]. These articles 
study investment rivalry across the same sample of U.S. chemical processes industries (between 
twenty-four and thirty-nine industries), during two decades
1
. 
Gilbert and Lieberman [1987] study the use of CEs only among incumbents. Their goal is 
determining, in a non-co-operative framework, whether incumbents expand capacity in order to 
maintain their market shares, so that they “co-ordinate” CEs, or they do not expand capacity to 
maintain their market shares, but instead try to pre-empt each other’s CEs. They find that 
capacity size differences generate maintenance of market shares amongst larger firms and pre-
emption amongst smaller firms. 
We are going to concentrate on CEs timing exclusively among incumbents. In this paper 
we re-state and adapt Gilbert and Lieberman (henceforth, GL) [1987], with the aim of testing for 
the existence of CEs timing patterns in the U.K.´s petroleum refining industry during the period 
1948-1998. Surprisingly against the background, our results do not support the hypothesis that 
incumbents practised any CE timing pattern. 
 
Hypothesys to test 
It makes sense to conceive that incumbents firms time their CEs either in order to keep 
their market share or in order to enlarge it. Otherwise CEs would be unnecessary. This gives 
                                               
1
 When we assert that Lieberman [1987a,b] and Gilbert and Lieberman [1987] treat timing tangentially, we are 
asserting that these articles are not testing models where time is the decision variable. Rather, they are explicitly 
proposing an exogenous timing of CEs. The special feature of their models consists, as we will see, of associating a 
given exogenous timing to the (pricing) models they test. 
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place to the possibility of spotting some type of CE execution among incumbents, which repeats 
(more or less) regularly, which we define as a CE timing pattern. 
 
HYPOTHESIS: If long term incumbents followed any CEs timing pattern in the U.K.’s 
petroleum refining industry, then either they have expanded capacity making 
round-robins, maintaining market shares and/or pre-empting each others. 
Otherwise no CEs timing pattern existed. 
 
Data and Variables 
What we are searching for in this analysis is identifying the presence of CE timing 
patterns among incumbents in the U.K.’s petroleum refining industry during the period 1948-
1998. It is worthy to note that U.K.’s refiners keep outstanding capacity size differences. We 
consider only firms which operated longer than 5 years in this industry.  
We will study the CE timing behaviour of firms after they had settled in the U.K.’s 
petroleum refining industry throughout the reference period. In order to do so, we use fixed-
effects logit models.  This type of model allows us to take into account the capacity size 
differences existing among incumbents. We test the three hypotheses stated in the main 
hypothesis (and described below): The practice of round-robins, maintaining market-share and 
pre-emption.  
The basic data consists of production capacity by firm and total industry output. We 
compute the data as follows: 
 
tiK , : Total capacity of firm i on January 1 of year t 
Qt: Total industry output during year t 
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We analyse CEs at firm level: There is one observation per firm and year in which the 
incumbent is a producer. We estimate investment behaviour by using fixed-effects logit models 
on the probability that a firm expanded capacity. We set a binary dependent variable equal to 1 
for all observations where firm i increases primary capacity more than 5.00% in the observation 
year. Thus: 
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In the petroleum refining industry, like in other chemical processing industries, apart of 
expanding capacity through additions to existent refineries or new refinery construction, firms 
can expand capacity by eliminating bottlenecks, which in essence stems from learning-based 
improvements achieved at negligible investment costs. These usually do not reach more than 
5.00% expansion rate. Hence, our choice of a (larger than) 5.00% threshold on expansion size is 
made to screen out incremental expansions of this nature. 
We also choose a dichotomous measure for CEs in this part of the study, because with 
economies of scale in new capacity, the ratio in equation (1) may take on extremely large values 
for small, growing firms. Following GL [1987], defining investment as a dichotomous variable 
avoids this capacity scaling problem.  
Building a new refinery may take up to two years, while expanding an existing refinery 
usually can be done more quickly. Completed CEs thus reflect the influence of firm and industry 
conditions prevailing from one to two years before the observed expansion date. We list the next 
explanatory variables, which are meant to describe these conditions: 
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 Capacity Utilisation (CUt). Represents the average rate of capacity utilisation over the 
prior two-year period: 
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 Output growth rate (GROWt).  Defines the historical rate of output growth over the prior 
four-year period:  
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 Firm’s capacity share ( tiSHARE , ). Firm i’s share of total industry capacity at the start of 
year t: 
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 Change in capacity share ( tiDELSHR , ). The change in total industry capacity share of 
firm i from the start of year t-2 to the start of observation year t is
2
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 “Bandwagon” effect ( tiBAND , ). This is a variable that records rival´s CEs; we define the 
“bandwagon” variable in year t as follows: 
                                               
2  We select a two-year period to measure the changes in capacity shares, because this corresponds to the lag 
associated with the construction of new refineries. 
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The variable BAND is the percentage by which all producers other than firm i collectively 
increased their capacity during the observation year. GL [1987] asserts that BAND is inversely 
related to the change in firm i’s capacity share during the observation year, which results from 
the actions of competing firms. This differs from the variable DELSHR, because DELSHR refers 
to changes in capacity share that results from own as well as rivals’ investment and it is 
measured over the preceding two years.  
 GL [1987] holds that a positive coefficient for BAND implies that a firm’s expansion 
tends to be correlated with expansions of other firms, after we control for the influence of 
historical growth and/or capacity utilisation. To the extent that each firm is knowledgeable of the 
investment plans of its rivals, a positive BAND coefficient suggests that firms have a tendency to 
invest simultaneously instead of staggering their investments over time. This is equivalent to 
state that firms tend to “hop on the wagon”. 
 
 Interaction terms 
 The major asymmetries across firms in this industry relate to their market shares. For 
detecting possible differences in CEs timing behaviour that vary systematically with market 
share, we compute multiplicative terms between the total industry capacity share of each firm 
(SHARE) and each one of the independent variables (excluding SHARE itself). 
 It is also plausible that the investment asymmetries attributed to market shares may result 
from differences in industrial concentration. Product markets for which firms have large share 
also tend to have high concentration levels. To differentiate the two possibilities we define a 
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second set of multiplicative terms by using firms’ Herfindahl-Hirschman ratios (HERFIN) as 
multiplicative variables. Recall, 
2
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In contrast to GL [1987], we find them significant several times for our case study. Then 
we include these concentration interactions set along with the share interactions set in the models 
as explanatory variables. 
 Additionally, most firms in the sample are either multinational petroleum companies or 
local petroleum refining companies. Conceivably, these groups might differ in their CEs timing 
behaviour, basically because multinationals tend to be larger firms integrating operations from 
crude extraction to derivatives distribution.  
To test this assertion we define a dummy variable for multinational companies (1) and 
non-multinational companies (0) and then multiply it by CU, DELSHR and BAND as part of the 
independent variables. Again in contrast to GL [1987], these have explanatory power in the 
U.K.’s petroleum refining industry case. 
 
The interaction terms used can be summarised as follows: 
 
tGROWSH = xGROW t tiSHARE ,  
tDELSHS xDELSHR ti , tiSHARE ,  
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tBANDHERF = xBAND ti , tHERFIN  
tDELSHERF = xDELSHR ti , tHERFIN  
tCUSH = xCU t tiSHARE ,  
tCUHERF = xCU t tHERFIN  
 
Observe these interaction terms have basically the following root variables: 
CU 
GROW 
DELSHR 
BAND 
 Which are interacted with the following asymmetry variables: 
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 We have to remark that these interaction terms impact on equation (1) will follow the 
effects the root variables are expected to have on the hypotheses tested. 
 
 Lagged terms 
 All independent variables are computed in first and second differences, over the one-year 
capacity additions and two-year refinery construction periods. As a result, for any given firm, 
observations begin at least one year after the firm entered the industry. This excludes initial 
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capacity investment by entrants. Consequently, the dependent variable registers expansions by 
incumbent firms only. Note lagged terms are not included in GL [1987]´s models. 
 
 Other terms 
 Completing the specification of the dependent variable tiy , in equation (1), all independent 
variables are included in their quadratic and inverse forms. The quadratic-form coefficients are 
interpreted as the linear-form ones, since the underlying variable is the same. The inverse-form 
coefficients stand for multiplicative effects of the underlying variable. 
 Since some first attempts to fit prospect models show severe specification problems with 
the linear form of the independent variables, these terms are included with the aim of inductively 
determining better specifications for the dependent variable in equation (1). This certainly 
distinguishes our work from GL [1987]. 
 We describe now the results we expect in order to contrast our main hypothesis. 
 
Capacity Expansion Timing Patterns models 
Round-robins  
According to GL [1987], the Cournot-Nash model with identical firms predicts an 
investment round-robin, with no firm building its (N+1)
st
 refinery until every other firm has at 
least N refineries. The assumptions according to which firms take rival expansions projects as 
given and have identical technologies and product characteristics are very restrictive. Hence, it 
would not be surprising if the round-robin investment behaviour predicted by the Cournot-Nash 
model were rarely observed in our data sample. Nevertheless, this hypothesis about firm’s CEs 
timing can be tested.  
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Although the round-robin hypothesis assumes that firms are symmetric in capacity, GL 
[1987] show that we may generalise this to allow for asymmetric installed capacity among 
firms
3
. Bearing this in mind, consider an industry with M competitors. Let rit be an indicator 
variable that takes on a value of 1 if firm i invests at date t, -1/(M-1) if firm j invests at date t, and 
zero otherwise. Let us define the variable 
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The start date ( 0 ) corresponds to a point in time at which all firms have made an 
equal number of CEs (but with possibly unequal market shares). If firms invested following a 
round-robin pattern, then itR  would be bounded above by +1 and below by –1. If firms had 
unequal number of CEs (and possibly unequal market shares) at the start date, but followed a 
round robin, then the bounds on itR  would differ, but the difference between its upper and lower 
bounds would be at most two. 
Then an examination of the frequency distribution of itR  permits us to assess empirically 
the presence of an investment round-robin. Any observations of itR  separated by more than two 
units cannot belong to a round-robin. Of course, even if firms followed a round-robin, mistakes 
in actions or observations may occur. We can incorporate this fact by allowing a confidence 
level for the fraction of observations of itR  in equation (2) that may lie outside a bound of two 
before this hypothesis can be rejected. We allow for a 5.00% (we contrast the round-robin 
hypothesis without stating any sub-hypothesis). 
 
 
                                               
3 Observe firms that are clearly members of a competitive fringe may be excluded from the round robin. 
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Maintaining-market-share  
We assert that the market share of any firm can be proxied through its share of total 
industry capacity. We follow this assertion when we examine the maintaining-market-share 
hypothesis.  Capacity-sharing asymmetries among firms will play a major role in pursuing this 
CEs timing pattern, because the motivation to make CEs would be determined by refiners 
projecting to sustain their market stake. 
 The maintaining-market-share hypothesis is basically a generalisation of the round-robin 
hypothesis: If firms maintained their market shares, they should be willing to expand capacity all 
at the same rate each time, even if that rate were changed. Moreover, each firm would expand 
only until after every other firm has done so. However, under this hypothesis, decisions to 
expand capacity are more linked to market fluctuations in the sense that this type of behaviour 
stipulates that firms expand solely to protect their market stake, not for the mere aim of 
following each other, as in a typical round-robin. 
In a maintaining-market-share CE timing regime, the average rate of investment of each 
firm over time should grow with the product of the growth rate and its market share or 
concentration index. Capacity utilisation rates per se should have no effect on this investment 
pattern. GL [1987] holds that firms should respond negatively to DELSHR, the measure of their 
change in capacity share and they should respond positively to BAND. If rival firms announce CE 
programmes corresponding to a high value for BANDi,t, firm i must respond with a CE of its own 
to maintain its share of industry capacity. We extend these expected effects to any variables whose 
roots are DELSHR or BAND. 
 Excluded from this part of the modelling of equation (1) are variables GROW, SHARE, 
HERFIN, CU (and its multinational companies interaction terms), CUxSHARE and CUxHERFIN. 
The first three variables GROW, SHARE and HERFIN, are omitted from this model because in a 
system in which CEs are timed to maintain market share, and consequently industrial 
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concentration, each firm’s investment should be positively impacted by the product of its market 
share and the industry’s growth rate.  
Hence, variables GROSH and GROWHERF should completely capture the positive effects 
of market growth on industry investment in a maintaining-market-share regime. We omit CU and 
the interaction variables CUSH and CUHERF, because capacity utilisation should not be a 
determinant of CEs under maintaining market shares, since incumbents are rather “herding” 
instead of “planning strategically”. 
GL[1987] specify the following model on the maintaining market share hypothesis: 
 
ttttttti eBANDSHaBANDaDELSHSaDELSHRaGROWSHay  54321,
 
which using our data sample, turned out to be mis-specified. 
 
Consequently, we specify the next model to test the expected relationships among 
variables and then assess the maintaining market share hypothesis in our data sample. The 
specification proposed is correct. Note building up to equation (1a) implied keeping in mind the 
underlying reasoning of the maintaining market share hypothesis as looking for the best 
econometrical quality of the model. 
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Pre-emption  
 We define pre-emption as the act of making a CE before any other rival firm in order to 
render its CE less attractive by reducing the value of its investment opportunity. Successful pre-
emptive investment should generate an increase in market share that lasts for some time and 
should not stimulate investment activities by competing firms.  
In contrast to the behaviour pattern in a model in which firms maintain market shares, a 
reduction in any firm´s market share should not induce to invest when firms engage in effective 
pre-emptive strategies. Hence, the DELSHR variable (including its version restricted to 
multinational companies) and its interactions with SHARE and HERFIN should not have any 
explanatory value in the pre-emption model. 
 Following GL [1987], we can use industrial CU data to test whether a pre-emptive CE 
timing strategy is put in practice. When a firm invests, total capacity increases, and if there is no 
price reduction, CU declines. Therefore, if capacity utilisation has any effect on investment, it 
must be positive for pre-emption to be effective. Otherwise, pre-emption will only help to 
stimulate investment by other firms since they will perceive it as an empty threat. Hence, a 
positive correlation between CU and the probability of expanding capacity is a necessary 
condition for effective pre-emption. 
 Additionally, if all firms other than firm i announce a CE, the information should cause 
firm i to consider a delay in its own decision to expand capacity. This implies that BAND should 
be negatively correlated with CEs under pre-empting CE timing. Nonetheless, according to GL 
[1987], this correlation could be reversed if incumbents invested simultaneously for reasons that 
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are not captured by other explanatory variables (for example, an innovation process could lower 
costs and trigger new investment by all firms in the industry). 
GL[1987] specify the following model on the pre-emption hypothesis: 
 
ttttttti eBANDSHaBANDaGROSHaGROWTHaCUSHaCUay  654321,
 
which using our data sample, turned out to be mis-specified. 
Consequently, we specify the next model to test the expected relationships among 
variables and then assess the pre-emption hypothesis in our data sample. Observe although in the 
fit of equation (1b) we will find opposite significant signs not only between 
21  and  tt GROWGROW , but also between 1 and tt BANDBAND , the specification proposed is 
correct. Note building up to equation (1b) implied keeping in mind the underlying reasoning of the 
pre-emption hypothesis as looking for the best econometrical quality of the model. 
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Analysis of results  
We analyse the existence of CE timing patterns for both Greenfield refineries 
construction and capacity additions to Greenfield refineries executed during 1948-1998. In 
tables 1, 2 and 3 we examine, respectively, the three hypotheses related to our main 
hypothesis: The practice of round robins, maintaining-market-share and pre-emption. 
 
Round-robins  
The first of these hypotheses is the practice of round robins. In table 1 are listed the 21 
petroleum refining companies in our sample. The fact that those firms had unequal number of 
investments after 1948 shows up in the bounds of the intervals in the lower part of table 1. 
We find that, even allowing for a confidence level of 5.00% on the bounds of the round-
robin interval, only a 19.05% of firms during 1948-1998 in the U.K.’s petroleum refining 
industry intended not to expand capacity until after every other firm had done so. Therefore, 
we can infer, examining the frequency distribution of itR  in equation (2), that the round-robin 
investment hypothesis has little support in this case study. 
 
Maintaining-market-share  
In a more realistic environment, market shares will fluctuate with random changes in 
factors that determine demand and supply, even if firms are investing with the objective of 
maintaining their market shares. Firms following a strategy of maintaining-market-share 
could be expected to expand capacity when (and only when) they detect reductions in their 
market shares that they consider substantial relative to historical random variations. 
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The fixed-effects logit model in table 2 is overall significant and well specified at 5.00%. 
According to this fixed-effects model, 53.31% of CEs variations in the industry can be 
explained through the relationships we have modelled. Note six out of the ten explanatory 
variables show contrary signs to the ones expected under the maintaining-market-share 
hypothesis: At a 5.00% significance level, we reject the null sub-hypotheses 1), 2) and 3) with 
respect to 96531 ,,, wwwww  and 10w . 
On the one hand, observe for every 1.00% increase, although DELSHR had a negative 
(but multiplicative) impact on the probability of expanding capacity of about 0.00000006% in 
year t, capacity differences on change in capacity share (DELSHS) had a positive influence in 
year t-1 of 0.0000005%. Similarly, concentration differences on change in capacity share 
(DELSHERF) had a positive influence but in year t-2 of 0.0000008%.  
Thus, it is less likely that firms were expanding to change capacity share in current years, 
as expected under the maintaining-market-share hypothesis, instead, larger firms were 
expanding more probably to change capacity share one year before. Additionally, in periods 
of higher industrial concentration, all firms were prone to change capacity share two years 
before. 
On the other hand, from the same fixed-effects model of equation (1a) in table 2, we note 
in year t-1, for every 1.00% increase of BAND, the CE probability rose 0.0000002% for any 
refiner and 0.0000003% for multinational companies only. However, for each 1.00% 
increment in the capacity differences of the percentage firms other than firm i expanded 
(BANDSH) in years t-2 and t, the CE probability diminished, respectively, 0.000001% and 
0.0003%. Concentration differences on the percentage firms other than firm i expanded 
(BANDHERF) had also a negative impact on the CE probability in year t-1 of about 
0.000006%. 
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Then, firms, multinationals or not, might have been trying to “band-wagon” CEs a year 
before current years, which would be (with delay) expected under the maintaining-market 
share hypothesis, but larger firms were not inclined to “band-wagon” their decisions either in 
the current year or two years before. Analogously, in periods of higher industrial 
concentration, one year before was characterised for a decreasing probability of “band-
wagon” decisions.  
Observe in year t-1 each 1% increment of BANDHERF was diminishing the probability 
of expanding capacity more than each 1% increment of both BAND and BAND
M
 were 
augmenting it, which does not support the maintaining market share hypothesis. 
Besides, in spite of the result that for each 1.00% increase in the concentration 
differences on production growth (GROWHERF) in year t the probability of expanding 
capacity increased 0.014%, for each 1.00% rise in the capacity differences on production 
growth (GROWSH) in year t, the probability of expanding capacity dropped 0.0007%. This 
means, although higher concentration periods were more suitable for expanding when output 
grew, whenever output grew larger firms were not expanding capacity. 
Then, what can we infer about the practice of maintaining market shares as a CEs timing 
pattern in the U.K.’s petroleum refining industry between 1948 and 1998? Analysing 
overlapping effects, we can infer that, in higher industrial concentration periods, no firm was 
expanding capacity to maintain its market share, and irrespective of industrial concentration 
levels, larger firms were not expanding capacity to maintain their market share. Therefore, the 
practice of this CE timing pattern does not sustain. 
Pre-emption  
The last hypothesis related to our main hypothesis is pre-emption. In table 3 we present 
the fixed-effects logit fit of the pre-emptive CEs model in equation (1b). This is significant 
 18 
and well specified at 5.00%, and its explanatory variables are all significant at 10.00%. 
However, only 23.74% of CEs variations in this industry can be explained through this model. 
In fact, at a 10.00% significance level, we reject the null sub-hypothesis in 4), in 5) only with 
respect to 8z , and in 6) only with respect to 2z . 
We see from equation (1b) ´s model in table 3 that for each 1.00% increase in year t of 
the capacity differences on capacity utilisation (CUSH), the probability of expanding capacity 
rose 0.0000002%. Also, for each 1.00% increase in year t of the concentration differences on 
capacity utilisation (CUHERF), the probability of expanding capacity dropped 0.0000003%. 
This contradicts the pre-emption hypothesis, because in any case the negative effect of 
CUHERF was greater than the positive effect of CUSH on the probability of expanding 
capacity. 
Besides, table 3 displays that for each 1.00% increment of BAND in year t, the probability 
of expanding capacity fell in year t 0.00000015%, which agrees with the pre-emptive 
hypothesis. However, in contrast with this hypothesis for every 1.00% increase in BAND from 
year t-1 this probability increased 0.00000021%. Further, in year t-1, for each 1.00% rise in 
the differences of concentration on the percentage firms other than firm i expanded 
(BANDHERF), this probability fell 0.0000012%. 
Additionally, we observe that output-growth related terms signs were mixed. For 
instance, while each 1.00% rise of output growth in year t-2 raised the probability of 
expanding capacity in about 0.00000017%, a similar increment in year t-1 reduced it around 
0.00000022%.  
Likewise, even though for every increase in 1.00% during year t-1 and year t of the 
capacity differences on output growth (GROWSH), the probability of expanding capacity rose, 
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respectively, 0.0000003% and 0.0000013%, this fell 0.0000029% for each 1.00% increase in 
the concentration differences on output growth (GROWHERF) in year t. 
In consequence, we infer that the positive impact of capacity utilisation needed for pre-
emption to be effective is not fulfilled. We also infer that the absence of “band-wagon” 
behaviour, required by the pre-emption hypothesis, is only partial. Besides, in higher 
industrial concentration periods, all firms were more prone to concede investment 
opportunities to competitors, as expected under the pre-emption hypothesis, but with a year 
delay. 
Nevertheless, the mixed signs of output- growth related variables reveal that, even though 
larger firms were more willing to expand capacity in the current year and one year before, 
when output grew, this was not true for smaller firms. Thus, one year before, CEs were likely 
done by larger firms. However, two years before, CEs were undertaken with the same 
probability by any firm when output grew. During higher industrial concentration periods, in 
both one and two years before the current year, CEs were less likely done by anyone. 
What shall we deduce then about the practice of pre-emptive CE timing in this industry 
during 1948-1998? We observe from the fixed-effects logit model of table 3 that according to 
equation (1b), the pre-emption hypothesis does not hold undoubtedly for our data. Therefore 
we infer that pre-emption does not sustain as a CEs timing pattern in the U.K.´s Petroleum 
Refining Industry during the reference period.  
 
Conclusions  
Evidence is against the maintaining-market-share hypothesis. We can state that 
evidence from the U.K.’s petroleum refining industry does not support the timing of CEs in 
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order to maintain market shares, at least during the phase 1948-1998. This nullifies the 
possibility that round robins explain the observed CE timing behaviour. We are also unable to 
support the hypothesis that CEs were used pre-emptively in our case study. Evidence in the 
U.K.’s petroleum refining industry does not point out that pre-emptive timing of CEs was 
practiced during 1948-1998 either.  
We have attempted to determine the existence of CE timing patterns in the U.K.’s 
petroleum refining industry between 1948 and 1998. Neither round robins, nor maintaining 
market-share, nor pre-emptive hypotheses resisted our scrutiny. Therefore, we assert that no 
CEs timing pattern is detected; consequently, we reject the main hypothesis.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Dixit, A., (March-1980), “The role of investment in entry deterrence”, The Economic 
Journal, vol. 90, pp. 95-106. 
 
Driver, C., (2000), “Capacity utilisation and excess capacity: Theory, evidence and 
policy”, Review of Industrial Organisation, Nº 16, pp.69-87. 
 
Duetsch, L.,(June 1984), “Entry and the extend of multi-plant operations”, The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, Vol. XXXII, Nº4, pp.477-487. 
 
Ghemawat, P., (December 1984), “Capacity expansion in the titanium dioxide 
industry”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XXXIII, pp.145-163. 
 
Gilbert, R. and M. Lieberman, (spring 1987), “Investment and co-ordination in 
oligopolistic industries”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 18 Nº 1, pp. 17-31. 
 
Haskel, J.and C. Martin, (March 1994), “Capacity and competition: Empirical 
evidence on U.K. panel data”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XLII, Nº1, pp. 
23-44. 
 
Lieberman, M., (June 1987), “Excess capacity as a barrier to entry”, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, Vol. XXXV, Nº4, pp.607-625. 
 
 21 
Lieberman, M., (winter 1987), “Post-entry investment and market structure in the 
chemical processing industries”, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol.18 Nº 4, pp. 533-549. 
 
Koscianski J. and S. Mathis, (March 1995), “Excess capacity and the probability of 
entry”, Resource Policy, Vol. 21, Nº1, pp.43-51. 
Koscianski J. and S. Mathis, (1996), “Excess capacity as a barrier to entry in the US 
titanium industry”, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, Nº 15, pp.263-281. 
 
Masson, R. and J. Shaanan, (August 1986),” Excess capacity and limit pricing an 
empirical test”, Economica, Nº 53, pp. 365-378. 
 
Singh, S., M. Utton and M. Waterson, (1998), “Strategic behaviour on incumbent firms 
in the U.K.”, International Journal of Industrial Organisation, Nº16, pp.229-251. 
 
Smiley, R., (1988), “Empirical evidence on strategic entry deterrence”, International 
Journal of Industrial Organisation, Nº 6, pp.167-180. 
 
The Department of Trade an Industry, (1948-2000),  “Digest of the United Kingdom 
Energy Statistics”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
              FIRM                          itR                  DIFF. W.R.T MEAN 
 
Amoco U.K. Ltd.-Milford Haven -3.22 -4.47 
Berry Wiggings & Co. Ltd.- All refineries 3.57 2.32 
British Petroleum.- All refineries 12.61 11.36 
Burmah Oil Trading.-All refineries 1.29 0.04* 
Carless Solvents Ltd.-Harwich -1.02 -2.27 
Conoco Ltd.- South Killinghome -1.01 -2.26 
Continental Oil Co. Ltd.-Killingholme -2.14 -3.39 
Eastham Refinery Ltd.- All refineries -3.20 -4.45 
Elf Oil (G.B.) Ltd.-Milford Haven -3.20 -4.45 
Esso Petroleum CL- All refineries 7.99 6.74 
Gulf Oil-GB.-Milford Haven 1.14 -0.11* 
Lindsley Oil Refinery Ltd.- South Humberside 0.02 -1.22 
Lobitos Oilfields,Ltd.-Ellsmere Port -0.92 -2.17 
Manchester Oil Refinery Ltd.- All refineries -2.00 -3.25 
Mobil Oil CL.-Corynton, Essex 10.05 8.80 
Nynas U.K. AB.-Dundee -4.30 -5.55 
Phillips Imperial Petroleum Ltd.- Teesside -2.10 -3.35 
Philmac Oils Ltd.-Eastham, Cheshire 1.11 -0.13* 
Shell U.K..Ltd.- All refineries 8.11 6.86 
Texaco Ltd.-Pembroke, Dyfed 1.16 -0.09* 
William Briggs & Sons Ltd.- Dundee 2.32 1.07 
 
mean 
 
1.25 
std 4.72 
 
Number of obs. in [0.24936,2.24936]               4 
Number of obs. in [0.19936,2.29936]         4 
 
*It is in both intervals 
 
 
 
Table 1. Round-robin hypothesis test  
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      tiy ,              
   
                      
  2tGROWSH      -115590.5 
      (0.010) 
  
tDELSHR
1
   -9.301189 
       (0.000) 
   
  1tDELSHS     82.02417 
        (0.002) 
  1tBAND     41.68089 
        (0.005)  
  2tBANDSH      -197.4335   
         (0.025) 
  
2
tBANDSH     -51447.7 
        (0.023) 
  
MN
tBAND 1       50.60321 
          (0.045) 
  
2
tGROWHERF    2307744 
          (0.008) 
  1tBANDHERF    -965.0341 
          (0.008) 
    
  2tDELSHERF     133.1216        
        (0.036) 
 
   
  Log likelihood  -24.895189 
  Number of obs 158 
  LR 2  56.86* 
  Prob > 2  0.0000 
  Pseudo R
2
  0.5331 
  P>|z| of hatsq 0.889  
   
*Ten d.o.f 
 
 
 
Table 2. Capacity Expansions under maintaining-market-share model 
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      tiy ,              
   
                     tCUSH   35.11789   
     0.001 
   
  tCUHERF   -51.99578  
     (0.055) 
 
  1tGROW      -36.76154 
      (0.005) 
   
  2tGROW    28.18804 
       (0.019) 
   
  tGROWSH     213.3346 
        (0.008) 
   
  1tGROWSH     53.28783 
        (0.002)  
   
  tBAND       -25.93732   
        (0.000) 
   
  1tBAND     35.74431 
        (0.000) 
   
  tGROWHERF      -487.1737 
          (0.040) 
   
  1tBANDHERF    -206.6739 
          (0.004) 
   
 
  Log likelihood  -196.46624  
  Number of obs 985 
  LR 2  122.30* 
  Prob > 2  0.0000 
  Pseudo R
2
  0.2374 
  P>|z| of hatsq 0.091  
*Ten d.o.f 
 
 
Table 3. Pre-emptive Capacity Expansions model  
